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Ethical and Aggressive Appellate Advocacy:
Confronting Adverse Authority
J. THOMAS SULLIVAN*
.. we view this as one of those rare cases in which the result below is
so improbable that it reveals a fundamental failure on our part to
interpret the Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint
on judicial discretion.
Crawford v. Washington'
1. INTRODUCTION
The problem posed by unfavorable precedent is one that plagues
appellate lawyers. Regardless of how reasonable a different result on a
given claim would be in light of the facts available in a particular case,
the existence of a controlling rule of law that requires rejection of the
claim often frustrates counsel's best efforts at representing the client.
Were we always able to write on the almost mythical "clean slate," the
win/loss records of appellants' counsel would undoubtedly improve,
although at the expense of appellees' counsel. Yet well-reasoned argu-
ments and well-argued appeals for justice still prevail at times, and
appellate lawyers should be cautious in assuming that precedent will
necessarily prove to be unyielding in the face of creative lawyering.
The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington2 demon-
strates that appellate courts are susceptible to the need to correct even
their own errors, suggesting that appellate lawyers should not despair
when confronted by adverse decisions that will, arguably, doom their
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law; Founding and
Senior Editor, The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process. Copyright, 2004, by the author.
An earlier version of this article was included in course materials provided at the Eighth Circuit
Appellate Practice Institute, September 13-14, 2004, St. Louis, co-sponsored by The Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process and the Eighth Circuit Bar Association.
1. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
2. Id.
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arguments. Crawford is particularly interesting in several respects, not
the least of which is that the majority's reversal in thinking did not result
in the overruling of a prior decision. Instead, the majority concluded
that the rationale for its prior decision in Ohio v. Roberts was essentially
too broad and permitted constitutionally-erroneous reliance.3
The issue presented in Crawford involved the admission of a state-
ment made to police by an accomplice not available for cross-examina-
tion at trial.4 The defendant's wife, Sylvia, had given a statement to
police officers investigating the stabbing of a man who had reportedly
attempted to rape Sylvia.5 The statement was offered at trial to impeach
Crawford's claim of self-defense, even though his wife did not testify.6
Crawford objected to admission of the statement7 as violative of his
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.8
The Washington appellate courts reached different conclusions on
admissibility of the out-of-court statement made by Crawford's wife to
the police. The court of appeals concluded that the statement did not
bear sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant its admission without the
accused being afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.9
The state supreme court had reversed the court of appeals, holding that
statements given by both Crawford and his wife were sufficiently "inter-
locking" to demonstrate the reliability of Sylvia's statement, thus render-
ing it admissible over the Sixth Amendment objection.'"
The Crawford Court reviewed the use of the "indicia of reliability"
test articulated in Ohio v. Roberts by the lower courts for admission of
testimonial statements of non-testifying accomplices in arriving at its
conclusion that Roberts was overly broad in its suggested application of
this test to all confrontation issues. I I In Roberts, a forgery and receipt of
stolen property case, the critical fact was that the testimony offered in
rebuttal at trial had been given at a prior proceeding in which the
accused's counsel had an opportunity for cross-examination.' 2 The wit-
3. Id. at 60 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
4. A confession or statement given in response to police interrogation, as well as an exparte
affidavit, is testimonial in nature. Id. at 52.
5. Id. at 38.
6. Id. at 40.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause provides, in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." Id.
9. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41. The opinion of the Washington Court of Appeals was not
published. State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-11, 2001 WL 850119, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30,
2001).
10. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663-64 (Wash. 2002).
11. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62-65.
12. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1980). The fact that defense counsel had not
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ness, who could not be located for subpoena for trial, had testified that
the accused had been staying with her at her parents' home, but that she
had neither given him permission to use their credit cards nor given him
the forged check on her mother's account that he had in his possession.'
3
The Court's decision in Roberts reflected a long-standing approach
to admission of hearsay in situations in which prior sworn testimony is
offered at trial in the absence of the declarant.14 But the Crawford Court
was concerned that the "indicia of reliability" test used to justify admis-
sion of prior statements or testimony of unavailable witnesses had been
too broadly stated, suggesting that it would always provide a rationale
for their admission. 5 The suggested broad application of the Roberts
"indicia of reliability" test was reinforced by the Court in its later 5-4
decision in Lee v. Illinois.'6 There, the majority had rejected admission
of an accomplice's confession despite its generally "interlocking" rela-
tionship of factual admissions contained in Lee's own statement to the
police.17 The proposition that "interlocking" confessions would provide
a constitutionally reasonable basis for admissibility of the non-testifying
accomplice's testimony-often particularly valuable in rebutting an
accused's own testimony disclaiming prior incrimination 8-had been
advanced in Parker v. Randolph. 9
Ironically, Lee proved dispositive in the Washington Supreme
Court. Even though the Lee Court had rejected the admissibility argu-
ment based primarily on the unreliability of accomplice statements
inculpating others,2° the state court relied on the general proposition that
"interlocking statements" demonstrate sufficient "indicia of reliability"
to justify admission in the absence of cross-examination. 2  Because the
statements of Crawford and Sylvia did not depart on critical facts, as had
the statements given to the police by Lee and his accomplice, the Wash-
engaged in a particularly rigorous cross-examination of the witness at the preliminary hearing was
essentially characterized as a matter of strategy or tactics. The fact that the defense had an
opportunity to cross-examine on the critical issue of consent was sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause. Id.
13. Id. at 58.
14. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (admitting cross-examined preliminary
hearing testimony of witness unable to recall facts at trial); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1895) (prior declaration or testimony of deceased witness admissible); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408
U.S. 204 (1972) (prior trial testimony admissible where witness unavailable due to being out of
the country).
15. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62.
16. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
17. Id. at 538-39.
18. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985).
19. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 79 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
20. Lee, 476 U.S. at 539.
21. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (Wash. 2002).
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ington court concluded that Lee's doctrinal position justified admission
of Sylvia's statement as an "interlocking confession."22
Thus, the Crawford Court was placed in the somewhat odd position
of rejecting prior doctrine without overruling its prior decisions. Ohio v.
Roberts involved a correct application of the rule governing admission
of prior sworn testimony.2 3 Lee v. Illinois had correctly rejected the pro-
position that "interlocking confessions" justified admission of an accom-
plice's statement to police without the accused having a meaningful
opportunity for cross-examination. 4
The Crawford majority observed that a number of courts had
applied the "indicia of reliability" test articulated in Roberts to uphold
the admission of testimonial statements of accomplices who did not tes-
tify at trial and were consequently unavailable for cross-examination.25
In reviewing these cases, it concluded: "The legacy of Roberts in other
courts vindicates the Framers' wisdom in rejecting a general reliability
exception. The framework is so unpredictable that it fails to provide
meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations."26 Con-
sequently, the Crawford Court explicitly rejected the admission of such
presumptively unreliable statements-statements made to the police by
accomplices-categorically. 27
For any appellate lawyer, Crawford stands squarely for the proposi-
tion that courts do rethink their decisions and the language they have
used, and when convinced of the need to do so, overrule defective prece-
dent. While even the very best arguments may fail to induce a court to
overrule its prior decisions, cases like Crawford remind us that an
important part of the development of legal doctrine involves rejection of
flawed propositions. The advancement of law is not simply a straight
line aimed in one direction; it is, in fact, often something more like a
frayed or knotted thread or a series of curves, angles, and sharp turns.
Nevertheless, courts strive to avoid departures from the norm, and even
the best arguments for overruling precedent will tend toward failure, if
22. Id. at 664.
23. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 (2003) (observing that "[e]ven our recent cases,
in their outcomes, hew closely to the traditional line") (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56
(1980)) (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 58-59. The Crawford majority rejected the argument that, by implication, Lee
authorized admission of a fully interlocking confession in its rejection of the statement admitted
against Lee based on its divergence from the admissions in the accomplice's statement. While
conceding that this inference was possible, Justice Scalia pointed out that it was not an inevitable
inference, noting "[i]f Lee had meant authoritatively to announce an exception-previously
unknown to this Court's jurisprudence-for interlocking confessions, it would not have done so in
such an oblique manner." Id. at 59.
25. Id. at 62-65.
26. Id. at 62-63.
27. Id. at 61, 68-69.
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raised at the wrong time, before the wrong panel, or on the wrong set of
facts.
II. THE PREFERENCE FOR PRESERVING PRECEDENT
Appellate courts are justifiably reluctant to overrule prior decisions,
as the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Paulson v. State28
in language expressing a commonly held sentiment:
We should not frivolously overrule established precedent. We follow
the doctrine of stare decisis to promote judicial efficiency and consis-
tency, encourage reliance on judicial decisions, and contribute to the
integrity of the judicial process. But if we conclude that one of our
previous decisions was poorly reasoned or is unworkable, we do not
achieve these goals by continuing to follow it. 9
In Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson,3" the Idaho Supreme Court
offered its rationale for the principle of stare decisis. "[T]he rule of
stare decisis dictates that we follow [precedent], unless it is manifestly
wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law
and remedy continued injustice."31 The critical feature of the system
based upon precedent is its stability and predictability that permits citi-
zens and attorneys to correctly apprehend the law in understanding its
application.
While stability in legal doctrine and procedure is undoubtedly
important to the maintenance of a legal system predicated on judicial
decisions,32 the ability of the law to serve the public interest is itself
dependent upon the willingness of appellate courts to rethink proposi-
tions often basic in nature and reject prior judicial expressions when
necessary. For example, Justice Harlan commented on the sometimes
competing virtues of stability and justice in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc.:" 3
The confidence of people in their ability to predict the legal conse-
quences of their actions is vitally necessary to facilitate the planning
of primary activity and to encourage the settlement of disputes with-
out resort to the courts. However, that confidence is threatened least
by the announcement of a new remedial rule to effectuate well-estab-
28. Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
29. Id. at 571-72 (citation omitted).
30. Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 803 P.2d 978 (Idaho 1990).
31. Id. at 983.
32. The burden is typically placed upon a party arguing that the precedent, which should be
overruled, would result in "injustice or great injury." See Hill v. State, 65 S.W.3d 408, 453 (Ark.
2002).
33. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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lished primary rules of behavior.3 4
With that observation, "the Supreme Court overruled a century's worth
of precedent which had denied recovery for wrongful death under the
general maritime law."35 The Mississippi Supreme Court explained its
duty to overrule precedent a bit more dramatically in Brewer v.
Browning:
36
The names of great judges of the past, who have adorned this
court, have been brought into honored review, in the suggestion of
error, as great names in the judicial history of this state. We revere
the memory of these judges, and have great respect and deference for
their decisions. Able and eminent as these judges were, they were
human and fallible, and, while we would not lightly depart from rules
laid down by them, still we must, where they have decided cases
which operate to effect injustice or lead to wrong results, apply the
corrective as though we had rendered the same decisions. We do not
intend to depart lightly from precedents. We expect to consider and
adhere to them where they are sound in principle; but we refuse to
crucify justice on the cross of precedent.3 7
If every attempt to overrule controlling precedent could justifiably
invoke the degree of passion exhibited by the Brewer court, the problem
of contesting controlling rules of law would be far less difficult for
counsel. Most issues, however, offer far less drama in terms of their
consequences, and the litigant is sometimes far better positioned if the
controlling precedent concerns a matter engendering less passion, as in
Moragne. A few decades later, the same Mississippi court observed:
"Unless mischievous in its effect, and resulting in detriment to the pub-
lic, a case will not be overruled although wrongly decided."38
Effective appellate advocacy requires counsel to approach adverse
precedent carefully, but creatively. Not infrequently, appellate lawyers
fail to serve the interests of both their clients and the public by simply
deferring to precedent, rather than strategically setting about to change
the law.
III. THE CONTROLLING ETHICAL RULES
There are surprisingly few ethical rules directed at the conduct of
appellate counsel and they may be summarized quickly: counsel should
represent the client competently; counsel must disclose adverse authority
34. Id. at 403.
35. Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 465 (Miss. 1983) (referring to
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 375).
36. Brewer v. Browning, 76 So. 519 (Miss. 1917).
37. Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
38. Childress v. State, 195 So. 583, 584 (Miss. 1940) (emphasis added).
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to the tribunal; and counsel should refrain from asserting frivolous
claims or issues. A review of the specific rules should provide assur-
ance to appellate lawyers that good faith advocacy will not result in
sanction.
A. The ethical directive for competent representation
At the outset, Rule 1.1,19 the catch-all competence rule, directs law-
yers to provide "competent representation to a client."'40 Competence is
defined by the rule as possessing the "legal knowledge, skill, thorough-
ness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."14 1
This suggests that counsel at a minimum must be sufficiently apprised of
controlling case and statutory law in the jurisdiction to advise the client
properly concerning the existing state of the law with regard to those
issues posed by the client's case. In addition, counsel should also be
aware of the likelihood that precedent or authority contrary to the cli-
ent's position may either be distinguished or overruled. Regrettably, all
too often trial counsel makes a strategic or tactical decision that binds
appellate counsel, rather than consulting with the attorney who will actu-
ally be representing the client on appeal at the outset of litigation. This
results in many excellent arguments being forfeited or waived as a result
of trial counsel's decisionmaking, or lack thereof.
What Rule 1.1 does suggest is that counsel can aggressively
represent the client's interests, even in the face of adverse authority, pro-
vided counsel has a good faith basis for going forward. After all, coun-
sel must bear in mind that virtually all changes in case law result either
from the impact of legislation or from the willingness of advocates to
challenge existing doctrine.
At least in criminal cases, the analog to the requirement for compe-
tent representation is suggested by the effective assistance guarantee of
the Sixth Amendment.42 The guarantee has been applied to representa-
tion on the direct appeal as a matter of right,43 but not to discretionary
review following disposition of the direct appeal.44 The Supreme Court
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.1 (2003).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
43. E.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 79-81 (1988).
44. An indigent criminal defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel as a part of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of effective assistance in a petition for discretionary review in a state court
or for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-19 (1974). Nor
is a criminal defendant entitled to appointed counsel in a post-conviction action under the Sixth
Amendment, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987), even in a case in which the death
penalty has been imposed. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). Concluding that the
Constitution does not guarantee a right to post-conviction attack on a criminal conviction, the
2005]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
initially applied the right to effective assistance in representation in a
direct appeal for failure to perform rather ministerial functions, such as
giving timely notice of appeal.45 More recently, in Smith v. Robbins,4 6
the Court held that counsel's decision not to raise an issue on direct
appeal could constitute ineffectiveness, provided the two-prong standard
for ineffectiveness applied in Strickland v. Washington47 is met. With
regard to the latter type of claims, however, the Strickland test is ren-
dered somewhat more difficult than might otherwise be obvious by the
Court's deference to counsel's professional judgment in determining
what issues should be advanced in the direct appeal.48
The interplay of rules governing ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel most likely means that a decision by counsel not to challenge
existing adverse authority or precedent will probably not be found to be
ineffective when counsel has chosen other issues to argue in the direct
appeal. Smith v. Robbins, however, offers the possibility that a claim of
ineffectiveness might potentially prove meritorious if counsel is unaware
of recent trends in the law that suggest that the precedent will not with-
stand attack, or if counsel deliberately chose to argue points having little
or no potential for reversal when the client sought to have a controlling
principle overruled, and there was simply no strategically sound reason
for not doing so.
In the context of civil litigation, the remedy available for counsel's
defective performance is a negligence action for legal malpractice.4 9
These claims are difficult to establish, in part because the same defer-
ence to counsel's professional judgment that characterizes the Court's
interpretation of the effective assistance guarantee in Jones v. Barnes
appears to generally apply to counsel's performance in civil appeals."0
Court has held that no inference of constitutionally ineffective assistance entitling the defendant to
federal habeas relief could be drawn from counsel's failure to perform effectively in a state post-
conviction proceeding. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991); see also
Wainwright v. Toma, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (holding that counsel's defective performance in state
post-conviction litigation did not provide a basis for federal habeas relief).
45. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
46. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000).
47. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Strickland test requires the
defendant to first demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently and not as a result of an
objectively reasonable strategy. id. at 690-91. The second prong requires a showing that but for
counsel's defective performance, there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome in the
proceeding. Id. at 694.
48. In Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), the Court held that counsel was not required to
argue all colorable claims, even despite the express wishes of the client, because the conduct of
the appeal is generally committed to counsel's professional judgment.
49. For a treatment of appellate malpractice, see Steven Wisotsky, Appellate Malpractice, 4 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 577 (2002), drawn from Chapter 13 of his treatise, PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT ON APPEAL: BRINGING AND OPPOSING APPEALS (2002).
50. In a civil action, Randall v. Bantz, Gosch, Cremer, Peterson & Sommers, 883 F. Supp.
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Moreover, recovery is typically foreclosed by a more rigid test than that
imposed as the second prong of Strickland; the plaintiff is required to
show that the appeal would have succeeded "but for" counsel's errors. 5 1
While the general approach of Rule 1.1 is designed to ensure com-
petence in representation, in fact, there is not a very strong enforcement
mechanism for determining when competence has not been demon-
strated, nor prospects for litigants challenging the performance of their
counsel on appeal. In addition to the general admonition of Rule 1.1,
counsel must bear in mind the two specific rules that specifically bear on
the conduct of the appeal.
B. The "good faith" approach to challenging precedent
First, Rule 3.1 provides the framework for aggressive appellate
advocacy:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or contro-
vert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing
so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the
defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding
that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the pro-
ceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.52
The rule provides an opening for creative lawyering in affording counsel
the option of arguing the need for overruling precedent.53 The key is
that the argument be made in good faith, which, at a minimum, suggests
the need for counsel to formulate a colorable reason why the precedent
should be overturned, limited, or distinguished.54 A failure to set forth a
colorable legal reason for overruling, however, is likely to be considered
fatal to the request.
Ethical rules authorize the imposition of sanctions against a party or
449, 450 (D.S.D. 1995), the malpractice claim was rejected where the plaintiff argued that his
appellate counsel failed to present issues for the purpose of preserving his option of petitioning for
certiorari to the Supreme Court. Because the issues had not been argued in the appellate court, the
option of petitioning for certiorari was not available. See Wisotsky, supra note 49, at 580 (noting
the testimony of a constitutional law expert's opinion that issues proposed by a lawyer were far
more likely to succeed than those proposed by the client).
51. Wisotski, supra note 49, at 581-82.
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (emphasis added).
53. "The role of an advocate necessarily is to be partisan for his or her client .... " BRENT E.
NEWTON, NAT'L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, CRIMINAL LITIGATION AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 5 (2004), available at http://www.nita.org/sampleChp/crimlitigation.pdf.
54. The Supreme Court has advanced its definition for legal "frivolity" in holding that a legal
argument is frivolous when it "is squarely foreclosed by statute, rule, or authoritative court
decision." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 894 (1983). In this circumstance, the Court has
concluded that the holding is not subject to being reconsidered or overruled. A claim is factually
frivolous when "lacking any factual basis in the record of the case." Id.
2005]
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counsel for advancing a frivolous appeal." For instance, the applicable
rule in Arkansas, set forth only in the rules governing civil appeals, pro-
vides that "a frivolous appeal or proceeding is one that has no reasonable
legal or factual basis."'56 Curiously, but perhaps realistically, the "frivo-
lous appeal" language of Rule 11 of the civil appellate rules has no
counterpart in the separate rules that govern the conduct of Arkansas
criminal appeals.57
However, in a State's appeal attempted by the Arkansas Attorney
General, State v. Warren,58 the state supreme court sanctioned counsel
for violation of criminal appeal rule 3(c).5 9 This rule does not define a
specific "frivolousness" standard, but defines only the standard applica-
ble for assessing the proper grounds for taking a state's appeal. Counsel
taking the appeal in the case ran afoul of the certification rule because its
only attempt at justifying the appeal was expressed in terms of the Attor-
ney General being "'not happy with the Ross decision"' and because it
considered the prior decision to have been "'wrongly decided.""'6
Relying on its previously applied standards for imposition of sanctions
for taking a frivolous appeal in a civil case in Stilley v. Hubbs,6 1 the
Warren court concluded "[w]e will not allow the State to pursue frivo-
lous appeals of criminal matters without recourse when we have held
that such actions in a civil case warrant sanctions. 62 The court then
ordered the State's appeal dismissed and referred its opinion to the Com-
mission on Professional Conduct,63 as well as identifying the offending
55. For excellent treatments of the problem of frivolous appeals from differing perspectives,
see Mark R. Kravitz, Unpleasant Duties: Imposing Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, 4 J. App.
PRAC. & PROCESS 335 (2002) (arguing generally for aggressive appellate court enforcement of
standards preventing the filing of frivolous appeals) and Brent E. Newton, When Reasonable
Jurists Could Disagree: The Fifth Circuit's Misapplication of the Frivolousness Standard, 3 J.
App. PRAC. & PROCESS 157 (2001) (criticizing the characterization of criminal appeals as frivolous
and the increased threat of sanctions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit).
56. ARK. R. App. P., Civ. R. 1 (b) (West 2005). In Jones v. Jones, 944 S.W.2d 121 (Ark.
1997), the court invoked the rule and ordered counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be
imposed.
57. See State v. Warren, 49 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Ark. 2001) ("The Rules of Appellate
Procedure-Criminal do not authorize the imposition of sanctions for frivolous appeals in
criminal cases.").
58. Id.
59. ARK. R. App. P., CRIM. R. 3(c) (West 2005), which addresses appeals taken by the state,
requires the Office of the Attorney General to certify that a state's appeal is essential to ensure
correct and uniform application of criminal law.
60. Warren, 49 S.W.3d at 106. In State v. Ross, 39 S.W.3d 789, 790-91 (Ark. 2001), the
court had unequivocally held that under the Youthful Offender Act a prior felony conviction could
not support a subsequent felon-in-possession charge.
61. Stilley v. Hubbs, 40 S.W.3d 209, 213 (Ark. 2001).
62. Warren, 49 S.W.3d at 107.
63. Id.
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Assistant Attorney General by name in its published opinion.6'
The court's treatment of appellate counsel in Warren reflects only
part of the picture. Courts themselves often err in their evaluation of
frivolousness of claims advanced by counsel on appeal. The classic
example is presented by the history of litigation in McKnight v. General
Motors Corp.,6 in which the Seventh Circuit rejected as frivolous a
claim that section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be applied
retroactively in light of prior circuit authority. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed the frivolousness determination, while
the claim itself was rejected on the merits.66 Despite the prior holdings
of the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court concluded that the issue was
not frivolous because other courts had resolved the question differently,
demonstrating a reasonable basis for asserting the claim as well as pre-
serving the issue until finally resolved by the Court.6 7
Perhaps chastened by the prior disposition in McKnight, the Sev-
enth Circuit recently rejected sanctions while finding that an appellant's
claims were barred by both existing Supreme Court and circuit prece-
dent in Brunt v. Service Employees Int'l Union.6 8 The circuit court
observed:
Appellants did attempt to distinguish their case from [controlling
authority], and we defer to the district court's finding that Appellants'
complaint was not so frivolous that Rule 1 1 sanctions are
warranted.69
The credible attempt to distinguish controlling authority was sufficient
to establish counsel's good faith in raising the issue and avoiding sanc-
tions. Given the possibility that the reviewing court might have con-
curred with counsel's argument, or at least offered some intellectual
support for challenge to existing Supreme Court precedent, counsel's
assertion of the claim and supporting argument were consistent with eth-
ical and aggressive appellate advocacy. Further, in order to preserve the
claim for challenge in the Supreme Court in which that Court would be
asked to overrule or distinguish its precedent, counsel was required to
assert the claim in the intermediate court, a position perhaps lost on
intermediate appellate judges.
The treatment of the State's appeal in Warren and different
approaches to civil and criminal representation in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct emphasize the deference paid to criminal coun-
64. Id. at 106.
65. McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 511 U.S. 659 (1994) (per curiam).
66. Id. at 659-60.
67. Id.
68. Brunt v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 284 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2002).
69. Id. at 721.
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sel's exercise of strategic decisionmaking which is reflected in a number
of ways in the criminal justice system. The right to effective assistance
of counsel, ensured by the Sixth Amendment, establishes the extent to
which representation in criminal matters is deemed central to the correct
operation of the justice system. Attorneys representing civil litigants
simply do not enjoy quite the same sense of autonomy in advising their
clients, just as appellate lawyers have less autonomy than trial counsel in
their conduct of litigation.70
C. The duty to disclose adverse authority
The model rules impose a duty on counsel to disclose adverse
authority to the court not otherwise disclosed by opposing counsel.7
Rule 3.3(a)(2) specifically directs: "(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly...
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling juris-
diction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel .... The language of
the rule does not confine the disclosure duty to "precedent," or "binding
precedent," or even "persuasive authority."7 3 Rather, it suggests a
broader duty to litigate forthrightly, even when deception or suppression
of known authority would arguably help the client.
This suggestion of a broader duty to disclose than one limited to
"binding precedent," or prior authority dictating a particular result based
on application of a legal rule in cases resting on materially indistinguish-
able facts, was clearly relied upon by the court in Rural Water System #
1 v. City of Sioux Center, Iowa."4 In moving for summary judgment at
trial, Rural Water System's counsel had failed to disclose the existence
of a Sixth Circuit opinion adverse to its position75 in the litigation
against the City. The court observed:
Although Scioto Water is the only published decision of a federal
circuit court of appeals either this court or the parties have found that
considers directly one of the questions presented here-whether a
party that has paid off or bought out its loans from the FmHA can
70. The reason is simple: unlike trial counsel, appellate counsel is restricted by the record
created in the trial court and generally will not be permitted to raise new theories or issues not
advanced at trial, or error not preserved properly by trial counsel.
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2003).
72. Id.
73. For an excellent discussion of these differing concepts of "authority" in the context of "no
citation" rules and practices implicated by unpublished appellate opinions, see Stephen R. Barnett,
From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation
Rules, 4 J. App. PRAc. & PROCESS 1, 9-12 (2002).
74. Rural Water Sys. # I v. City of Sioux Ctr., Iowa, 967 F. Supp. 1483 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
75. Id. at 1498 n.2 (citing Scioto County Reg'l Water Dist. No. 1 v. Scioto Water Inc., 103
F.3d 38 (6th Cir. 1996)).
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still assert the protections of § 1926(b)-it is not even mentioned in
[Rural Water System # l's (hereinafter RWS # 1)] opening briefs in
support of RWS # l's motions for summary judgment. This omission
is all the more odd, because not only was the decision of the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals handed down on December 18, 1996,
approximately three weeks before the present cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment were filed, but counsel for RWS # 1 here was counsel
for the defendants-appellees in the Scioto Water case. Nor can RWS
# l's counsel's omission of the decision in Scioto Water be excused
on the basis that the City had already brought the decision to this
court's attention, because the City's and RWS # l's cross-motions for
summary judgment were filed the same day. RWS # l's counsel thus
had no assurance that the City's counsel would bring the Scioto
Water decision to the court's attention.76
The court found counsel's omission ethically unacceptable, if not strictly
warranting sanction, and its condemnation is worth considering:
It is hardly the issue that the rules of professional conduct require
only the disclosure of controlling authority, see, e.g., C.P.R. DR 7-
106(B)(1), which the decision of a court of appeals in another circuit
certainly is not. In this court's view, the rules of professional conduct
establish the "floor" or "minimum" standards for professional con-
duct, not the "ceiling"; basic notions of professionalism demand
something higher. Although the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals is obviously not controlling on this federal district court in
the Eighth Circuit, RWS # l's counsel's omission of the Scioto Water
decision from RWS # l's opening briefs smacks of concealment of
obviously relevant and strongly persuasive authority simply because
it is contrary to RWS # l's position. RWS # l's counsel did not
hesitate to cite a decision of the Colorado Supreme Court on compa-
rable issues, although that decision is factually distinguishable, prob-
ably because that decision appears to support RWS # l's position.
This selective citation of authorities, when so few decisions are dead
on point, is not good faith advocacy, or even legitimate "hard ball."
At best, it constitutes failure to confront and distinguish or discredit
contrary authority, and, at worst, constitutes an attempt to hide from
the court and opposing counsel a decision that is adverse to RWS #
1 's position simply because it is adverse.77
Thus, while strict compliance with the controlling rule may be avoided,
many courts will not find a deliberate attempt to conceal relevant author-
ity within the scope of "good faith advocacy, or even legitimate 'hard
ball.' ,78
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. (last emphasis added).
78. Id.
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The Model Rules do not unreasonably constrain counsel needing to
address adverse authority, but they do provide a framework for under-
standing the parameters of counsel's creativity. Even the most reserved
appellate attorneys will undoubtedly have to deal with contrary prece-
dent or authority and they should be prepared to do so. In order to effec-
tively assess the options available in representing the client's interests, it
is necessary that appellate lawyers think about alternatives for avoiding
the application of existing rules which will frustrate those interests.
IV. DEALING WITH UNFAVORABLE, CONTROLLING PRECEDENT
The most difficult problem faced by an appellate counsel often
involves the existence of unfavorable precedent within the jurisdiction
that is apparently controlling in the factual context. Counsel may have
sound reasons for challenging the existing rule or principle and for argu-
ing that controlling precedents should be overruled or distinguished. A
number of tactical options in dealing with unfavorable precedent, even
within the constraints of the combined requirements of Rules 3.1 and
3.3(a)(2), should be considered when confronting the problem of
adverse authority.
A. Challenging unfavorable precedent
Quite often, it is simply implausible to suggest that precedent will
not control the disposition of the case, or that prior decisions can be
distinguished on their facts. This is particularly true when the precedent
reflects repeated application of a rule or principle in a number of cases
in which facts were sufficiently different as to suggest that the control-
ling rule could have been avoided, but in which the reviewing courts
rejected the factual distinction arguments and continued to apply and
extend the existing principle or rule.
When faced with the need to challenge unfavorable precedent
directly, counsel should remain aware of the dual requirements for ethi-
cal advocacy set forth in Rules 3.1 and 3.3(a)(2). First, counsel should
identify the controlling precedent in the opening brief, or in the preser-
vation of error at the trial level, if possible. Second, counsel must be
prepared to advance the argument that the court should either not apply
or in the alternative overrule the precedent. In doing so, counsel should
bear in mind one overriding principle: in a system governed by judicial
precedent, evolution of legal doctrine necessarily requires courts to
respond to precisely the types of arguments that must be made by an
appellate lawyer aggressively representing the client's interest. Rather
than approaching the problem of contrary precedent apologetically,
counsel should affirmatively address the existing rule or principle in
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terms of the common law tradition in which change is the result of good
faith challenges to existing rules and principles.
In structuring the approach to be taken in challenging unfavorable
precedent, it is important to remember the various contexts in which
judicially-made law undergoes change. The posture of an appellate
court is not simply the result of common agreement that existing rules or
principles are correct. Courts themselves are often reluctant to rely on
existing precedent, but find themselves bound by prior decisions, or
lacking sufficient grounds for overruling them. Similarly, the views of
appellate judges change over time79 and changing views are often mani-
fested in changing law.8"
To ensure that challenges to existing precedent are not treated as
frivolous, counsel should be prepared to fashion an appellate argument
that fits within the directives of Rule 3.1. Additionally, a good faith
basis for arguing that precedent should be overruled is required to avoid
a finding that an argument or point is frivolous. At least three different
tactical approaches may be taken or used in combination.
1. CHANGING DOCTRINE AS THE NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION
First, counsel should always rely on prior dissenting opinions from
the Supreme Court, state supreme court, or lower appellate courts to
support the argument for overruling precedent. The history of appellate
practice shows that dissents often evolve into majority positions and
reliance on dissenting opinions to ask for overruling existing authority
provides a reasonable, good faith starting point for the argument.
An example of a good faith challenge to existing precedent that
ultimately proved successful may be drawn from the Roberts/Crawford
litigation. In State v. Earnest,8' a New Mexico murder prosecution, the
State attempted to force testimony from an accomplice, Boeglin, who
had implicated the defendant in one of four statements he had given to
police on the day of the arrest.82 Earnest, Boeglin, and a third defendant,
Connor, were charged with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and
79. For example, Justice Blackmun dissented from the plurality which held existing capital
punishment schemes unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). By the time of his retirement from the Court, his experience in
reviewing capital litigation led him to conclude that imposition of the death penalty, in practice,
could not be squared with constitutional guarantees of due process. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S.
1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
80. For a general discussion of the role of precedent in the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, see Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA.
L. Rav. 1 (2001).
81. State v. Earnest, 703 P.2d 872 (N.M. 1985).
82. Id. at 874.
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kidnapping in the murder of Eastman, who was supposedly suspected by
the other three men of informing on drug trafficking to police. Eastman
had left Boeglin's residence with Boeglin and Connor in his own car.
The next morning his body was found on the side of a state highway and
Boeglin, Earnest, and Connor were later arrested in possession of the
vehicle. Because of the absence of physical evidence linking Earnest to
the murder, the prosecution needed Boeglin's testimony in order to
obtain a conviction. Boeglin refused to testify despite a grant of immu-
nity and contempt citation. This resulted in a twenty-six year sentence
for contempt that was subsequently overturned on appeal.83 The trial
court ordered a mistrial as a result of his refusal to testify, purportedly
based on Earnest's mistrial motions contesting the court's attempt to
force Boeglin to testify.
After rejecting Earnest's double jeopardy claim, the trial court
ordered a retrial.84 This time, when Boeglin refused to testify, the court
declared him unavailable and permitted the State to offer his statement
implicating Earnest as a declaration against penal interest. On direct
appeal, Earnest relied on Douglas v. Alabama85 for the proposition that
the lack of any opportunity for cross-examination of Boeglin violated his
right to confrontation. The State countered that Ohio v. Roberts had by
implication overruled Douglas, supplanting the "indicia of reliability"
test for cross-examination as the test for admission under the Confronta-
tion Clause.86
The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that Douglas, rather
than Roberts, controlled on the facts presented because the prior state-
ment admitted in Roberts was preliminary hearing testimony where the
defendant had had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness,87 and it
reversed the lower court's decision. 88 The Attorney General, however,
did not accept this disposition. Instead, the State petitioned for review in
the Supreme Court again arguing that Roberts had effectively abrogated
Douglas. The case was argued, but not decided. Instead, the Court
vacated the state supreme court's judgment reversing Earnest's convic-
tion and remanded for reconsideration89 in light of its then-recent deci-
83. State v. Boeglin, 686 P.2d 257, 257-58 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
84. The state supreme court rejected Earnest's argument that the declaration of mistrial failed
to satisfy the "manifest necessity" test justifying retrial over his prior jeopardy claim, concluding
that defense counsel's repeated mistrial motions had waived the prior jeopardy bar. Earnest, 703
P.2d at 874-75.
85. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1965).
86. Earnest, 703 P.2d at 875-76.
87. Id. at 876.
88. Id.
89. New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986).
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sion in Lee v. Illinois.9"
Moreover, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief
Justice, and Justices Powell and O'Connor, concurred in the order
remanding Earnest. He observed that Lee overruled Douglas by impli-
cation, adopting the rationale of Roberts,9 and that Lee had apparently
adopted the "indicia of reliability" test as determinative of even an
accomplice's statement to police. Justice Rehnquist concluded that after
Lee, state courts could admit statements of non-testifying co-defendants,
assuming that the prosecution could overcome the "weighty presumption
of unreliability attaching to codefendent statements by demonstrating
that the particular statement at issue bears sufficient 'indicia of reliabil-
ity' to satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns. "92
On remand, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that Boeglin's
statement to police was sufficiently reliable as a statement against his
penal interest to justify its admission despite the lack of any opportunity
for Earnest to cross-examine Boeglin.93 The persistence of the Attorney
General in correctly concluding-at least prior to the Court's recent
holding in Crawford-that Roberts had dramatically reshaped our
understanding of the parameters of confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment represented reliance on the type of good faith argument for
overruling precedent that is a hallmark of creative lawyering.
2. LOOK FOR SUPPORT IN CIRCUIT SPLITS
As a second strategy, counsel should identify splits in circuits or
jurisdictions that have previously ruled on the issue raised, and marshal
arguments reflecting the contrary view taken in those courts favorable to
the client's position. A showing that reasonable jurists disagree on the
point or its resolution should meet the requirement for demonstrating
that a claim or argument is not frivolous under the standards implicitly
recognized in similar contexts. 94
An example of an argument for overruling precedent based on rea-
90. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
91. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 649-50 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
93. State v. Earnest, 744 P.2d 539, 539-40 (N.M. 1987). The Supreme Court thereafter
denied certiorari. Earnest v. New Mexico, 484 U.S. 924 (1987). Earnest was denied relief in
federal habeas corpus, Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1996), and the Supreme Court
again denied Earnest's petition for review by certiorari. Earnest v. Dorsey, 519 U.S. 1016 (1996).
94. The standard within the federal appellate system for the granting of a certificate of
appealability for review of an adverse determination in a federal habeas action is a showing that
the issue is one on which reasonable jurists debate or disagree. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983). By definition, a colorable claim which meets the standard for the certificate would
seemingly also demonstrate a non-frivolous claim. See Newton, supra note 55 (discussing
frivolousness findings in the Fifth Circuit).
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soning applied by other courts or differing conclusions reached on the
same issue is demonstrated by the treatment of claims of cumulative
error arising from multiple acts of ineffective assistance in criminal
cases. Both Arkansas95 and the Eighth Circuit refuse to consider claims
of cumulative ineffectiveness in counsel's performance.96 Arguably,
this approach contravenes the clear holding of Strickland v. Washing-
ton,97 in which the Court specifically addressed the question of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel in terms of
"showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defen-
dant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."98 It is clear from the
repeated reference to the plural "errors" in the opinion that the Court
contemplated cumulative consideration of counsel's performance, as
well as individual errors.99
But Strickland's language is sufficiently vague that lower courts
have been inconsistent in their understanding of its appreciation for the
cumulation of counsel's errors. In fact, there is a significant split among
jurisdictions on the application of cumulative error analysis to ineffec-
tive assistance claims. Even jurisdictions recognizing cumulative error
analysis are careful to require that the cumulation relates to actual defi-
ciencies that could be termed "errors" on the part of counsel, rather than
claims of deficient performance not amounting to errors, as the Tenth
Circuit pointed out in United States v. Rivera.'00
Some jurisdictions have rejected cumulative error analysis by effec-
tively concluding that in the absence of any single error warranting
relief, there can be no cumulation of errors.' 0 ' This approach appears to
ignore the precise rationale for the doctrine of cumulative error gener-
ally, as the Rivera Court pointed out:
The cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless errors
has the potential to prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a
single reversible error. The purpose of a cumulative-error analysis is
95. See Parks v. State, 785 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Ark. 1990). Parks cites to Isom v. State, 682
S.W.2d 755 (Ark. 1985), which in turn cites Guy v. State, 668 S.W.2d 952 (Ark. 1984), and
Henderson v. State, 663 S.W.2d 734 (Ark. 1984), as supporting the same proposition. Isom, 682
S.W.2d at 758. But Henderson did not involve a claim of cumulative ineffectiveness and the
doctrine of cumulative error in counsel's deficient performance is never discussed, even in dicta.
See Henderson, 663 S.W.2d at 734. Thus, the Arkansas rule is wholly unfounded in the court's
own precedents.
96. Girtman v. Lockhart, 942 F.2d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1991).
97. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 678, 679, 682, 693, 694, 695, 696.
100. United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469-72 (10th Cir. 1990).
101. Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1126 (Fla. 2003); McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721
S.W.2d 694, 701 (Ky. 1986).
[Vol. 59:341
CONFRONTING ADVERSE AUTHORITY
to address that possibility. 10 2
Ironically, both Arkansas courts 10 3 and the Eighth Circuit' 4 recognize
cumulative error analysis in other contexts.
In contrast to the approach taken by a minority of courts, a substan-
tial number of courts have recognized the applicability of cumulative
error analysis in assessing counsel's effectiveness when appropriate situ-
ations arise. °5 The significant number of jurisdictions recognizing
cumulative error analysis for ineffective assistance claims may afford a
good faith basis on which to challenge the Arkansas and Eighth Circuit
positions, as well as suggesting the potential "cert-worthiness" for such
a claim in a petition to the Supreme Court.
3. RELYING ON PERSUASIVE SECONDARY SOURCES
As a third tactic, counsel should consider citing secondary sources,
such as law review commentary, both favorable to the position being
advanced and critical to existing precedent. The partial overruling of the
Supreme Court's decision in Swain v. Alabama 06 by its later holding in
Batson v. Kentucky demonstrates an example of law review critique of
controlling precedent.10 7 Both cases stand for the proposition that the
prosecution cannot use its peremptory challenges in a racially discrimi-
natory fashion in a criminal trial by removing minority venirepersons
from service on the petit jury. The Swain holding, however, had
required defendants to demonstrate a pattern and practice of discrimina-
tion in the use of peremptories by prosecutors so difficult that it could
seldom be achieved. The Batson Court referred to this burden as "crip-
pling" in formulating a new rule for preservation of the claim of discrim-
102. Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1469 (relying on United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475-76
(9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Canales, 744 F.2d 413, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1984)).
103. See Edwards v. Stills, 984 S.W.2d 366, 389 (Ark. 1998) (holding counsel failed to
preserve cumulative error claim by making specific objection); Noel v. State, 960 S.W.2d 439,
442 (Ark. 1998), aff'd denial of post conviction relief, 26 S.W.3d 123 (Ark. 2000), habeas corpus
denied, Noel v. Norris, 194 F. Supp. 2d 893 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
104. See United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1992); accord United States v.
Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Benitez-Meraz, 161 F.3d 1163,
1166 (8th Cir. 1998) (observing that counsel argued claims of prosecutorial misconduct
individually and collectively on appeal). The Eighth Circuit has also recognized cumulative error
analysis in civil appeals. Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1993).
105. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991); Berryman v. Morton, 100
F.3d 1089, 1101-02 (3d Cir. 1996); Cooper v. Sowders, 837 F.2d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1988);
Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1995); Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1319
(9th Cir. 1994); Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2003); Bowers v. State, 578
A.2d 734, 743-44 (Md. 1990); Green v. State, 569 S.E.2d 318, 324-25 (S.C. 2002).
106. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
107. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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inatory use of peremptories."' The Court also noted that the Swain
procedure had been criticized by commentators in law review articles.' 0 9
The existence of significant negative commentary on existing precedent
in the nation's law reviews represents an important source of argument
supporting the need for change and should not be overlooked by counsel
struggling with adverse authority.
A classic example of the impact a law review article may have in
supporting an argument for overruling precedent is demonstrated by
Houghland Farms v. Johnson," in which the Idaho Supreme Court
revisited the issue of the scope of the state's long-arm jurisdiction stat-
ute. "' The proper scope of jurisdiction is particularly significant
because it limits the authority of trial courts within the state over non-
resident defendants, and in an era of increasing interstate commerce,
there are strong policy reasons for both expansive and restrictive notions
of this jurisdiction. In Houghland, the trial court had asserted long-arm
jurisdiction over an out-of-state loan broker who had contacted the Idaho
plaintiff about refinancing its loan on business interests located in Ari-
zona, 1 2 relying on the prior decision in Beco Corp. v. Roberts & Sons
Constr. Co." 3 The court overruled its prior decision in Beco,"4 relying
upon the analysis by Professor Lewis criticizing the Beco holding ' 5 in
an article published in the Idaho Law Review." 6
Professor Lewis's article was not merely persuasive; it dominated
the court's approach in overruling precedent.'7 Moreover, because sig-
nificant decisions are the subject of articles"' and student-written com-
108. Id. at 92-93 & n.17 (noting lower court concern that the burden could not reasonably be
met).
109. Id. at 90 & n.14.
110. Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 803 P.2d 978 (Idaho 1990).
111. IDAHO CODE § 5-514(a) (Michie 1990).
112. Houghland, 803 P.2d at 979-80.
113. Beco Corp. v. Roberts & Sons Constr. Co., 760 P.2d 1120 (1988).
114. Houghland, 803 P.2d at 983-87. Although the court held that the minimum contacts test
was demonstrated by the facts concerning the defendant's presence in Idaho, it concluded that fair
play and substantial justice considerations did not warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. at 984-
85.
115. Houghland, 803 P.2d at 983.
116. D. Craig Lewis, The Current Validity of Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in Idaho, 25
IDAHO L. REV. 223 (1988-89).
117. Houghland, 803 P.2d at 985 (citing Lewis, supra note 116, at 268-69).
118. In Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 803 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1986), the Sixth Circuit
considered the application of its prior holding in Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240
(6th Cir. 1983), affid sub nom. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), which had been affirmed
by the Supreme Court, to a civil rights claim brought before the circuit court's holding in Garner.
The plaintiff sought retroactive application of the circuit's decision in Garner holding that
Tennessee's fleeing felon statute was unconstitutional. Carter, 803 F.2d at 219. In assessing the
retroactivity argument, the court noted the substantial number of law review articles that had
challenged police deadly force policies. Id. at 222 & n.2.
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ments and casenotes, 119 this type of supporting authority is typically
readily available for major cases, and often for more minor ones.
B. Practical considerations in confronting adverse precedent
Appellate counsel considering a frontal assault on precedent should
consider the basic reasons why courts overrule prior decisions, or agree
with arguments for exceptions to application of existing precedent.
Generally, these may be summarized as follows:
1. CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE COURT
A change in the composition of the court itself is the most obvious
factor that appellate counsel may rely upon in advising the client on the
potential success of a challenge to existing precedent. Although a
change in court personnel is not a basis for legal argument and in fact,
suggesting it may incur the wrath of justices concerned with being
viewed as activist in their approach to precedent and stare decisis, it is
clearly an avenue for counsel's creativity.
The willingness of a "new" majority of an appellate court to reex-
amine precedent typically reflects the judicial philosophy of key judges
for whom precedent is less controlling than other considerations. Most
importantly, overruling of prior precedent typically occurs in supreme
courts rather than intermediate appellate courts. Judges at the top tier of
an appellate system are more susceptible to equitable and justice argu-
ments offered in support of change in the law because that is consistent
with the function of a court of last resort in a three-tiered judicial
119. For an interesting exchange regarding the value of student-written law review notes,
compare the positions taken by the majority and dissenting judges in State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Blevins, 551 N.E.2d 955 (Ohio 1990). The issue before the court concerned whether an arbitrator
could award punitive damages on a claim based on an insurance contract. Id. at 957. A prior
decision of the court in Hutchinson v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 478 N.E.2d 1000 (Ohio 1985),
had held that punitive damages could be awarded on the basis of a standard policy provision
promising to pay for losses incurred by the insured. The majority in Blevins observed that the
holding in Hutchinson was "controversial" and had been "sharply criticized" in law review
commentaries. Blevins, 551 N.E.2d at 958 & n.3. The majority's decision to overrule
Hutchinson, id. at 959, itself drew criticism from Justice Sweeney in dissent. Id. at 959-62
(Sweeney, J., dissenting). He attacked the majority's reliance on student written law review
articles, which he argued included misinterpretations of the term dictum and an incorrect assertion
that the Hutchinson court had not properly cited authority. Id. at 961 & n.5 (Sweeney, J.,
dissenting). The conflict in the majority and dissenting opinions suggests that appellate counsel
take care in citing law review materials, particularly when written by law students. But courts
continue to rely on student-written materials in support of their positions. See, e.g., Carter, 803
F.2d at 223 n.3: "For a comprehensive discussion of the trend of the law in the fleeing felon rule,
see Comment, The Unconstitutional Use of Deadly Force Against Nonviolent Felons, 18 Georgia
Law Review, 137 (1983)."
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system. ' 20
The classic example of a changing court composition influencing
an important principle of law is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's
treatment of victim impact evidence in capital prosecutions. This evi-
dence is considered essential in the movement for integrating the rights
of victims and their families into the criminal justice system. Death pen-
alty defense counsel and capital punishment opponents view the evi-
dence skeptically because it invites imposition of the death penalty
based on passion or sympathy present in a particular case and may arbi-
trarily or unfairly subject some defendants to capital punishment. Nev-
ertheless, the movement for inclusion of such evidence in capital trials
has generally been successful.
When initially considered by the Supreme Court in the context of
an Eighth Amendment/due process challenge in Booth v. Maryland,'2 1
the Court held that this evidence was fraught with potential for abuse in
the imposition of capital sentences. The Court reaffirmed this position
two years later in South Carolina v. Gathers.122 However, just two
years later, the Court's membership had changed and so had its view of
victim impact evidence. In Payne v. Tennessee 2 3 a new majority of the
Court overruled Booth with Chief Justice Rehnquist justifying the
change in constitutional interpretation or policy in terms of the narrow
majority in Booth and its lack of lengthy tradition as precedent.' 24
Payne vividly demonstrates that a change in the composition of an
appellate court may undercut a narrow or single vote majority resulting
in a shift in our understanding of the meaning of even basic constitu-
tional guarantees.
Arguing for the overruling of existing precedent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's position in Payne provides a good faith basis for challeng-
ing a rule or principle on the grounds that the prior holding was the
result of a narrow majority's view of the issue, or that the holding was
120. Here, an observation made by Dan Schweitzer, Fundamentals of Preparing a United
States Supreme Court Amicus Brief, 5 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 523 (2003), is illuminating:
... the Supreme Court cares deeply about legal reasoning and logic, policy and
practical considerations, and its own precedents. The Court is keenly aware that its
decisions are binding across the nation, and that they affect cases and factual
situations that are different from the case before it. For this reason, the Court wants
to explore the limits of any possible rule it may adopt, as well as examine the
jurisprudential and real world consequences. An amicus brief is well suited to assist
the Court in that endeavor.
Id. at 537.
121. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
122. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
123. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Justice Souter replaced Justice Powell on the
Court during the two year period following Gathers.
124. Id. at 827-28; see also Scalia, J., concurring, id. at 833-34.
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incorrect and has not withstood the test of time. 125 He pointed out that
the Court had overruled thirty three decisions in whole or part over the
past twenty years, and argued "[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable com-
mand; rather it 'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision.' "126
Counsel seeking an argument for overruling prior precedent should
consider referencing Chief Justice Rehnquist's position, 127 particularly
when challenging recent precedent or narrowly decided prior holdings in
order to demonstrate a good faith basis for the argument.
Although the changed composition of an appellate court may
explain a rejection of precedent, it does not constitute a good faith argu-
ment for overruling precedent by counsel. In Jones v. Jones,128 the
Arkansas Supreme Court imposed sanctions for counsel's assertion that
a change in the court's composition justified a petition for rehearing in
protracted litigation in the case. 129  In her petition, counsel candidly
argued:
A. The ruling in the March 7, 1997 per curiam order indicating that
the emotional needs issue was decided on it [sic] merits, and not on
procedural grounds, could not be accurately determined with the cur-
rent court. The Court erred in proclaiming that the November 22,
1996, mandate (Jones I) was decided on its merits, rather than on
procedural grounds for three reasons. First, Justice Brown, who was
a sitting Justice at the time that the Arkansas Supreme Court rein-
stated custody of the minor child to Ms. Jones (in Jones I) on Novem-
ber 22, 1996, indicated in his concurring opinion that the case was
reversed and remanded on procedural grounds, not on its merits. At
the time of the original hearing, Chief Justice Jesson, Associate Jus-
tice Roaf, and Associate Justice Dudley were sitting on the Court.
When the Writ of Prohibition was decided, Chief Justice Jesson, who
actually wrote the opinion, and Associate Justices Roaf and Dudley
were no longer on the Court. At this time, it would be difficult to
125. Id. at 828-30:
Booth and Gathers were decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents
challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions. They have been questioned
by Members of the Court in later decisions and have defied consistent application
by the lower courts.
126. Id. (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
127. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(observing that stare decisis is less rigid in application when applied to constitutional precedents).
128. Jones v. Jones, 947 S.W.2d 6 (Ark. 1997).
129. The history of litigation in Jones was extensive. See Jones v. Jones, 852 S.W.2d 325
(Ark. Ct. App. 1993); Jones v. Jones, 896 S.W.2d 431 (Ark. 1995); Jones v. Jones, 898 S.W.2d 23
(Ark. 1995); Jones v. Jones, 907 S.w.2d 745 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995); Jones v. Jones, 931 S.W.2d
767 (Ark. 1996). This extensive litigation in the appellate courts might have influenced counsel to
conclude that changed composition of the supreme court would lead to a different result, of
course.
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determine whether the November 22, 1996 Court (Jones I) reversed
the trial court and the Arkansas Court of Appeals on procedural or
substantive grounds as only four Justices that comprised the Novem-
ber 22, 1996 (Jones I) Court remain on the Supreme Court. Of those
four, only three Justices were of the opinion that the case was
reversed on substantive grounds. Three Justices do not comprise a
majority the (Jones 1) Court of November 22, 1996. Without the par-
ticipation of Chief Justice Jesson and Associate Justices Roaf and
Dudley, it would be impossible to know the basis for his or her ruling
(in Jones I) on November 22, 1996.130
The court noted counsel's attempt to pre-empt adverse conse-
quences by acknowledging the possibility that her advocacy had "over-
stepped the line," but nevertheless determined that the failure to
predicate the petition for rehearing on a specific factual or legal error in
the original opinion constituted an abuse of the rehearing process.
1 3 1
Consequently, the court imposed sanctions, awarding costs and attor-
neys' fees to the prevailing party.
132
2. CHANGE REFLECTING GENERAL PUBLIC CONSENSUS
The classic example of a long-term challenge to existing precedent
is the work of Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP in its litigation strat-
egy 133 to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson.134 The eventual victory in Brown
v. Board of Education 31 was the product of direct challenge to the con-
tinuing viability of Plessy. Certainly, the historical record reflects sub-
stantial social and political support for the Court's 1954 action in
Brown, but it is not clear legally that there was any greater force to the
legal argument which finally prevailed than to that which caused Justice
Harlan to dissent in Plessy.136
There are probably no unresolved issues in American constitutional
jurisprudence of the magnitude of Plessy/Brown. Developments in
130. Jones, 947 S.W.2d at 8.
131. Id. Justice Brown, who had disagreed with the majority's characterization that the court's
prior holdings had been rendered on the merits, argued instead that the case had been decided on
procedural grounds. He concurred specifically in the disposition on rehearing, explaining the lack
of a good faith basis for counsel's petition under the supreme court's rules. Id. at 9 (Brown, J.,
concurring) (citing ARK. SuP. CT. R. 2-3(g), which sets forth the recognized grounds for
rehearing).
132. Jones, 947 S.W.2d at 8.
133. E.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (holding Virginia law mandating
segregation of passengers on interstate motor carriers invalid as burden on interstate commerce).
134. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
135. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
136. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan observed that the doctrine
of separate, but equal "will, in time prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this
tribunal in the Dred Scott case." Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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medicine, biology, and digital technology, however, suggest long term
litigation battles will be fought pertaining to rights to life, medical treat-
ment, death, and privacy. Nevertheless, even less "significant" issues
than legally enforced discrimination based upon race warrant recurring
review and relitigation. This is particularly true when the underlying
issue involves competing views of fundamental rights or potential con-
flicts between constitutional principles that may induce courts of last
resort to revisit prior decisions. For instance, there will likely be contin-
uing conflict over the interpretation of the limits of the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, thus exemplifying a
tension that may never be finally resolved.
Another obvious example lies in the Supreme Court's reversal of
position regarding criminalization of adult homosexual sodomy. In
1986, the Court upheld the authority of states to criminalize consensual
adult sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick.137 The Bowers majority rejected
the dissenter's argument that this conduct had generally been subject to
decriminalization over time, reflecting a national consensus that adult
homosexual sodomy was protected by federal constitutional guarantees.
Less than twenty years later, a majority of the Justices reversed the
Court's position in Lawrence v. Texas,'38 holding that the state's sod-
omy law violated the liberty interests protected by the Due Process
Clause. 1
39
Moreover, the changing legal landscape on major social issues is
not necessarily limited to appeals raising federal constitutional issues.
Significant questions of state constitutional law may also influence
major doctrinal changes by a state court of last resort. For example,
even before the Supreme Court's shift in constitutional policy in Law-
rence, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down the state's sodomy stat-
ute in Jegley v. Picado,4 ° relying on the state's historical protection of
privacy in state law.' 4 ' The Lawrence Court noted the action taken in
Jegley v. Picado and other state court decisions rejecting criminalization
of consensual homosexual activity in reaching its conclusion.' 42
While conservative critics of the Supreme Court may characterize
137. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
138. Lawrence v. Texas, 529 U.S. 558 (2003).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002).
141. See Robert L. Brown, Expanded Rights Through State Law: The United States Supreme
Court Shows State Courts the Way, 4 J. App. PRAC. & PRocEss 499, 515-17 & n.60 (2002)
(explaining state law approach taken to void sodomy statute).
142. Lawrence, 529 U.S. at 570-71 ("Over the course of the last decades, States with same-sex
prohibitions have moved toward abolishing them."). The court then cited several cases addressing
prohibitions on same-sex sodomy. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.w.3d 332 (Ark. 2002);
Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct.
20051
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Lawrence and other decisions as "activist," the Court's action in this
case might be viewed in an entirely different light. Lawrence rests, at
least in part, on the perception of at least some Justices who must be
viewed as conservative-Justice Kennedy-or moderate-Justice
O'Connor-that Bowers v. Hardwick was no longer constitutionally via-
ble. Had this conclusion been reached simply on a difference in ideo-
logical or moral positions of the Court's membership, the "activist" label
might be appropriate. The Lawrence majority, however, looked to the
determinations of state legislatures in concluding that Bowers no longer
reflected a national consensus 4 3 on the proper scope of the liberty inter-
ests protected by the Due Process Clause."' Clearly, it does not rest on
the strict constructionist sentiment that prompted a narrow majority in
Bowers to hold that criminalization of sodomy was constitutionally per-
missible because it was contemplated by the drafters of the critical
amendments, or by the state legislatures representing the citizens in rati-
fying those amendments, 4 5 a proposition questioned by the Lawrence
majority.146 In fact, the Lawrence majority ultimately concluded that
Bowers had not been supported by historical precedent, as claimed by
the Bowers plurality.
As in Crawford, the Lawrence majority ultimately pronounced
Bowers as wrongly decided. "Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding pre-
cedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled."'
147
Undoubtedly, Lawrence was the product of rejection by a majority that
reconsidered the Court's prior authority in light of both its accuracy at
the time of decision in Bowers, and general public consensus reflected in
the lack of supporting state legislative action for implementation of the
restriction on personal liberty authorized by the Bowers Court.
The Lawrence Court simply corrected a socially unacceptable inter-
pretation of the Constitution in a means less formal than amendment
would have required. Overruling Bowers was predicated on the lack of
App. 1996); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); see also 1993 Nev. Stat. 236
(repealing NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.193).
143. Id. at 570-73. Of additional significance was the lack of enforcement of sodomy laws
even in jurisdictions maintaining the prohibition by statute.
144. Id. at 571-72 ("In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century
are of most relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex.").
145. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-93. See generally Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy
in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAmi L. REv. 521, 525 (1986).
146. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567-71 (noting that no state "singled out" same sex relations for
criminalization until the 1970's).
147. Id. at 578.
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support for its holding and recognition that the states, by implication,
had rejected its holding as a matter of public policy.
The Court's reliance on trends in state legislative action reflecting
public policy is even more pronounced in its decision in Atkins v. Vir-
ginia 48 overruling less than fifteen-year-old precedent, Penry v.
Lynaugh. '49 In Penry, the Court had rejected the argument that the exe-
cution of a mentally retarded capital defendant constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. 5 The Atkins Court, relying in part on Penry,
expressly noted the importance of state legislative action in assessing
whether national policy continued to support contemporaneous interpre-
tation of federal constitutional protections. 51 Significantly, the Atkins
Court noted that state legislatures had affirmatively moved away from
authorizing execution of the mentally retarded in the years following its
decision in Penry.'52
The Court's actions in Brown v. Board of Education, Lawrence,
and Atkins reflect its willingness to reappraise constitutional doctrine in
light of changing social policy. In Brown, the Court essentially reacted
to the failure of Congress and state legislatures to correct a long-term
legally indefensible policy. In Lawrence, the majority reconsidered the
evidence argued to support the precedent and subsequent legislative
trends, and concluded that its decision in Bowers was simply incorrect.
In Atkins, the Court reacted to recent and definitive trends in state legis-
lation to informally amend its interpretation of the applicable constitu-
tional provision. It brought its own view in line with national sentiment,
as reflected in the action of state legislatures.
Significant social issues will continue to warrant reconsideration
over time. As public sentiment or policy shifts on these matters, courts
may sometimes view the previously rejected legal arguments with
greater interest. Counsel should continue to argue the good faith basis
for overruling precedent in light of changing national sentiment, particu-
larly when reflected directly in the actions of state legislatures.
3. INTERPLAY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Because a primary duty of an appellate court is to interpret statu-
tory law, legislative action may prove an important source of argument
in addressing unfavorable precedent. Often, this results from the need to
148. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
149. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
150. Id. at 334-35.
151. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 ("We have pinpointed that the 'clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures.") (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 331).
152. Id. at 313-17.
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interpret legislation in light of existing precedent. An example of such
interpretation is the Arkansas courts' treatment of voluntary intoxication
as a defensive theory in criminal cases. Under common law principles,
voluntary intoxication could serve as a defensive theory that reduces the
degree of culpability as it impairs the defendant's intellectual
processes. 53 Typically, the application was important in first degree
murder cases that required proof of premeditation or deliberation, or a
high degree of criminal intent. Evidence of intoxication served to negate
the inference that the defendant was capable of operating with the requi-
site high degree of intent at the time of the offense because his intoxica-
tion compromised his ability to reason and make choices.
When the legislature abolished a statutory provision 54 that appar-
ently barred use of intoxication as a defense in 1977,11 the courts were
required to construe the legislative intent. Initially, the Arkansas
Supreme Court concluded that the 1977 enactment had the effect of
repealing the earlier prohibition and thus, reinstated the common law
recognition of the limited use of intoxication as a defense to criminal
intent in Varnedare v. State.1 56
The state supreme court revisited the issue in White v. State1 5 7
when the State, as appellee, responded to the defendant's argument that
the trial court incorrectly denied his requested instruction for intoxica-
tion as a defensive theory. The court properly rejected the claim
because the defendant had already been convicted on the lesser-included
offense of second degree murder and under Arkansas common law,
intoxication would not have afforded him a defensive theory to this
lesser degree of criminal intent.'58 It also straightened out its own view
of the legislative intent implicit in the statutory language, holding that
the General Assembly did not intend to reinstate the common law
defense when it expressly rejected reliance on voluntary intoxication as
a defense."' The White court overruled its prior decision in Varnedare
and effectively foreclosed reliance on voluntary intoxication as a defen-
153. Wood v. State, 34 Ark. 341, 344 (Ark. 1879).
154. ARK. STAT. § 41-115 (Michie 1964) (repealed) ("Drunkenness shall not be an excuse for
any crime or misdemeanor, unless such drunkenness be occasioned by the fraud, contrivance or
force of some other person, for the purpose of causing the perpetration of the offense.
(precluding reliance on voluntary intoxication through the clear language in the statute).
155. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-207 (Michie 2001).
156. Vamedare v. State, 573 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ark. 1978). ("By amending s 41-207 to remove
self-induced intoxication as a statutory defense, the legislature, in effect, reinstated any prior
Arkansas common law on the subject.").
157. White v. State, 717 S.W.2d 784 (Ark. 1986).
158. Id. at 787.
159. Id. at 787-88.
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sive theory in any context in Arkansas trials. 60 Because the Attorney
General continued to press the issue of legislative intent, the Arkansas
court eventually rendered a decision in White properly expressing the
General Assembly's position.
In some instances, counsel should consider challenging prior deci-
sions aggressively because the appellate courts have invited legislative
action. An example is presented by the history of litigation stemming
from the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Boren v. Boren.16 1 There,
the court voided a non-holographic will based on defective execution
because the witnesses executed a self-proving affidavit to the will, but
did not witness the will itself.1 62  The problem led to contrary judicial
results in other jurisdictions.1 63 The Texas courts, however, held to the
Boren rule that wills defective in this respect were not properly executed
under state probate law and refused to find that substantial compliance
with execution formalities warranted its admission to probate. 64
Some Texas decisions 16' and dissenting justices argued the inherent
unfairness in the application of a rule of form that effectively negated
and frustrated the testator's clear intent. 166  The legislature ultimately
responded to the court's "invitation" to correct the situation.1 67  In this
context, litigants faced with controlling precedent that appellate courts
refuse to overrule should continue to assert claims in efforts to induce
legislative or administrative action. 68 Unfortunately, for many litigants,
160. See Standridge v. State, 951 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ark. 1997) (holding that intoxication may
not form the basis for admission of mental state evidence on issue of culpability as authorized in
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-303 (Michie 2001)).
161. Boren v. Boren, 402 S.w.2d 728 (Tex. 1966).
162. Id. at 729-30.
163. See In re Estate of Cutsinger, 445 P.2d 778, 782 (Okla. 1968); In re Estate of Petty, 608
P.2d 987, 993 (Kan. 1980); In re Estate of Charry, 359 So. 2d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). But
see In re Estate of Sample, 572 P.2d 1232 (Mont. 1977) (following Boren).
164. See, e.g., Wich v. Fleming, 652 S.W.2d 353, 354 (Tex. 1983) (noting Boren rule followed
consistently in Texas decisions).
165. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 630 S.w.2d 645, 648 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (noting the court's
reluctance to follow Boren), writ refd, 630 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980).
166. Wich, 652 S.w.2d at 356 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
167. In Wich, 652 S.W.2d at 355, the court noted that "the Legislature [had] amended section
59 of the Probate Code twice since the date of the Boren decision, but [had] not modified the
[requirements for valid execution of a will to make substantial compliance adequate]." Id. The
legislature finally corrected the problem created by Boren wills in 1991, amending Section 59(b)
of the Texas Probate Code to provide that the signature of the testator on a self-proving affidavit
could serve as the signature required for the will itself. 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3062, 3065
(codified in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59(b) (Vernon 2003)). The amendment applied
retroactively to wills executed prior to the effective date of the Act, but not offered for probate
until the death of the testator subsequent to the effective date. Bank One, Tex., v. Ikard, 885
S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
168. For example, in Hopkins v. Hopkins, 708 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), the
appellant recognized the controlling authority of Boren but expressly preserved her claim for
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the laudable public service of fighting against an unjust rule in the appel-
late courts is simply not economically feasible, or may be contrary to
their own interests. 69 Consequently, the reluctance of courts to act
results in the continued application of unreasonable rules until the legis-
lature takes corrective action.
4. RECOGNITION OF NATIONAL TRENDS IN THE LAW
An important rationale for overruling precedent is that a jurisdic-
tion's view of an issue is simply out of step with the weight of authority
from other jurisdictions, or is contrary to an emerging national trend. A
classic example is demonstrated by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,'170 in which the court overruled a long-
standing rule of state workers compensation law. The issue involved
compensation for injuries suffered by employees on the employer's
property while coming or going from work.171 The court observed that
it had consistently rejected recovery for such injuries in a series of deci-
sions, including eight reported and eleven unreported cases. 172 The court
observed that under state law, only employees who suffer injuries as a
result of traveling "required routes" that preclude access by members of
the general public can recover.17
3
The Lollar court then noted that Tennessee was virtually alone
among American jurisdictions in applying such a restrictive rule to com-
pensatory recovery for an employee injured on an employer's property
while going to or coming from work.174 It ultimately concluded that its
"rule has not proved a workable one," pointing to a difficulty in recon-
ciling application of the rule in many of the cases in which the issue had
been raised.' 75 It then adopted an approach more consistent with the
clear national trend noted by Larson's treatise,1 76 holding:
review in the state supreme court for reconsideration of its prior holding. The court of appeals
acknowledged the propriety of her action, but held that it was bound to apply "the law as declared
by the supreme court."
169. The appellant in Hopkins did not press her claim, which sought to have Boren overruled,
in the Texas Supreme Court because she was able to negotiate a favorable settlement of her claims
with other heirs who faced the prospect that the court might overrule its prior decision and deprive
them of any recovery under the will.
170. Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. 1989).
171. Id. at 143-44.
172. Id. at 144 & n.1 (observing in a note its usual prohibition against reference to unreported
decisions).
173. Id. at 144-48 (summarizing numerous Tennessee decisions).
174. Id. at 148 (observing that only Tennessee and Kentucky applied such a narrow
construction for recovery and that Kentucky, as seen through Smith v. Klarer Co., 405 S.W.2d 736
(Ky. Ct. App. 1966), actually applied a less restrictive rule).
175. Id.
176. ARTHUR LARSON, 1 LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §15.11 (1985).
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[The] rule .. .has failed as a test for determining when en route
injuries are "in the course of employment." Faced with the prospect
of increased litigation on this issue under de novo review, we think
the better approach is to frankly admit the inequities that have
resulted from Tennessee's unique minority rule.' 7 7
The court expressly followed the lead of the New Mexico Supreme
Court 78 in Dupper v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., ' 79 rejecting a narrow con-
struction of the "coming and going rule" in favor of the broader rule
evidenced by the national majority trend:
In aligning ourselves with every other jurisdiction by adoption of the
premises rule, we simply recognize that the "course of employment"
includes not only the time for which the employee is actually paid but
also a reasonable time during which the employee is necessarily on
the employer's premises while passing to or from the place where the
work is actually done.180
Another example of a court conforming local law to a national
trend is the treatment of dramshop liability by the Arkansas Supreme
Court. In its 1965 decision, Carr v. Turner, the court rejected liability
for a defendant who furnished alcohol to minors injured as a result of
their intoxication.' 8 ' The court's holding persisted through a line of
cases until it reconsidered its position in 1997 in Shannon v. Wilson.'
8 2
In Shannon, the court observed, "[s]ince Carr, this Court has been
entreated to reevaluate the issue of a seller of alcohol's liability on
numerous occasions. Repeatedly we have held that absent a change in
the common-law principle by the legislature, this Court would not depart
from the ruling in Carr and its progeny."' 83 The court reminded the leg-
islature that it had suggested the need for corrective action through legis-
lation in the Carr opinion itself and noted its prior conclusion that few
other jurisdictions had imposed liability in the absence of legislative
action.' 84 The court then traced the history of appellate litigation on this
issue, noting its 'consistent' rejection of liability for alcohol providers
over the course of thirty years since 1965 when Carr was decided.' 85
The Shannon court then discussed the legislature's failure to act in
light of its own duty to address changing circumstances that warrant
177. Lollar, 767 S.W.2d at 150.
178. Id.
179. Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 734 P.2d 743 (N.M. 1987).
180. Id. at 746.
181. Carr v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Ark. 1965).
182. Shannon v. Wilson, 947 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1997).
183. Id. at 351.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 352.
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intervention. 86 Noting the increased public danger posed by intoxica-
tion in light of the common use of automobiles, the court observed,
"[t]he reality of modem life is evidenced by the fact that most drinking
establishments and liquor stores provide patrons parking lots." ' It con-
cluded, "[tjhe rule espoused in Carr was judicially created. When a
judicially created rule becomes outmoded or unjust in its application, it
is appropriate for the judiciary to modify it."' 88 In breaking with its own
precedent, the Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed a substantial body of
case law from other jurisdictions that demonstrated a decisive trend in
the law toward recognizing tort liability for providers of intoxicants
whose patrons cause or suffer personal injuries as a result of their intoxi-
cation.' 89 The court also looked to jurisdictions in which legislative
action has created liability. 9° The court recognized the weight of this
trend in noting:
Most state and federal courts that have considered this issue since the
1960's have reevaluated and rejected as patently unsound the rule
that a seller cannot be held liable for furnishing alcoholic beverages
to an intoxicated or minor patron who injures a third person based
upon the grounds that the sale or service is causally remote from the
subsequent injurious conduct of the patron. A substantial majority
have decided that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages may be a
proximate cause of such injuries and that liability may be imposed
upon the vendor in favor of the injured third person.' 9'
Even in dissent, Justice Newbern observed the value of challenging
existing precedent in the course of appellate litigation. Although he dis-
agreed with the majority's conclusion about the continuing viability of
the Carr rationale, he nonetheless prefaced his argument:
It is indeed proper for an appellate court of last resort to overrule a
prior decision when that decision was made on the basis of a mistake
or when conditions have changed so as to make it outmoded. Stare
decisis does not require stagnation. The law develops through the
application of tried-and-true principles to changing times. That is not
what the majority is about in this case.192
Such "tried and true principles," as reflected in a national trend
concerning the admission of expert opinion in medical malpractice, led
186. Id. (discussing prior deference to legislature with respect to issue of abolishing
governmental immunity from tort actions in Parish v. Pitts, 429 S.W.2d 45 (Ark. 1968)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 353 (citing decisions from the Oklahoma and Wisconsin courts and Justice William
0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949)).
189. Id. at 353-55.
190. Id. at 355-56.
191. Id. at 353.
192. Id. at 358 (Newbern, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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the Mississippi Supreme Court to adopt a "national" standard of practice
for surgeons. In Hall v. Hilbun, it abandoned the jurisdiction's long-
held practice of requiring proof of the "local" standard of care193 The
court specifically looked to rules applied in other states in support of its
conclusion that the "national" standard reflected a better rule of law. 
194
It also noted that its prior reliance on the "locality" rule had itself under-
gone some liberalization in terms of the expansion of the concept of
"locality."'' 95 The evolution of the rule afforded counsel a good faith
basis for asking for the necessary extension or modification required for
the malpractice plaintiff to develop proof of the breach of the standard of
care.
Clearly, shifting opinion regarding the correctness of judicially
imposed rules or principles can be instrumental in arguing the need for
overruling precedent. When apparent, counsel should not hesitate to
challenge adverse precedent directly and offer the appropriate policy
arguments, particularly when they are supported by a dominant national
trend in appellate decisionmaking.1 96
5. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER BRANCHES
OF KNOWLEDGE
New developments in non-legal fields of knowledge are often
reflected in changing attitudes toward theories of a claim, a defense, or
the admissibility of evidence. The most influential example of a devel-
opment in science that has been embraced by appellate courts has been
the recognition of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) technology as a means
of identification. The acceptance of DNA, however, does not really
indicate a change in appellate court views as a result of changing sci-
ence. Rather, it demonstrates the acceptance of a new technology not
193. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 873 (Miss. 1985). Although subsequent legislative action
abrogated the rule that a plaintiff could recover from "one, all or a select group of tortfeasors and
collect full damages from those parties sued," applied in Hall, DePriest v. Barber, 798 So. 2d 456,
458 at 7 (Miss. 2001), the rule regarding use of the "national" standard of care in medical
negligence actions continues to be viable. See Ortman v. Cain, 811 So. 2d 457, 462-63 at 21
(Miss. Ct. App. 2002); McCaffrey v. Puckett, 784 So. 2d 197, 202-03 at 17, 20 (Miss. Ct. App.
2001).
194. Hall, 466 So. 2d at 867-69.
195. Id. at 866-67. The court cited King v. Murphy, 424 So. 2d 547, 550 (Miss. 1982), in
which the court had expanded the relevant "locality" to include the entire state and "a reasonable
distance adjacent to state boundaries." King also recognized the admissibility of an opinion
rendered by an expert from beyond this "locality," provided they had familiarized themselves with
the standard of care within the "locality." Id.
196. But see Taylor v. State, 754 So. 2d 598, 609 at 29 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (rebuffing
counsel's reliance on Idaho authority in arguing his position to the Mississippi Court of Appeals,
observing that "Mississippi, of course, has ample case law on point regarding the standard
employed in reviewing a motion for a new trial").
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previously addressed by the appellate courts. This is not an uncommon
occurrence, as many new technologies simply require articulation under
relevant standards of admissibility. In other cases, however, appellate
courts change their views of relevance based upon newly emerging sci-
ence. For example, recent developments in the fields of psychiatric
medicine, psychology, and behavioral sciences have resulted in the
courts' recognition of new ways to look at human behavior. These
developments are truly recent and continuing, and therefore courts have
been forced to respond to creative efforts by lawyers to integrate new
thinking in the mental health and behavioral science fields into their
theories for relief or defense. Prior caselaw, which could not have
reacted to the previously non-existent degree of scientific knowledge,
proves inadequate to address claims and evidence now grounded in reli-
able scientific theory. As a result, courts continually re-evaluate existing
precedent in light of these developments.
An example of how scientific developments are influencing rules of
law is in the recognition of relevance and admissibility of expert opinion
on human perception in eyewitness identification cases. Traditionally,
many courts have held that admitting opinion testimony on the reliabil-
ity of eyewitness identification would invade the factfinding province of
the jury.'97 In State v. Chapple,'98 the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed
other courts' positions on the admissibility of expert testimony in crimi-
nal prosecutions in which identification was the central issue at trial.
The court also addressed the scientific developments in the field of psy-
chology relating to human perception.' 99 The Chapple court considered
the framework for admissibility of expert opinion developed by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Amaral, an earlier case that involved
exclusion of testimony relating to human perception. 200 It then further
noted that Amaral and other cases had uniformly upheld the exclusion of
this type of expert opinion. 201
Distinguishing the factual context underlying Amaral and other
rejections of expert opinion on the reliability of eyewitness testimony,
the Chapple court ultimately held that the evidence presented was
admissible and overruled a prior Arizona decision in the process.2 °2 The
197. See Caldwell v. State, 594 S.W.2d 24, 28-29 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Johnson,
112 Cal. Rptr. 834, 836-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); Jones v. State, 208 S.E.2d 850, 852-53 (Ga.
1974); Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 513, 521-22 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972).
198. State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc).
199. Id. at 1218 (observing that identification was the "°one issue" on which the defendant's
guilt or innocence hinged).
200. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
201. Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1218.
202. Id. at 1220 (overruling State v. Valencia, 575 P.2d 335, 337 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)).
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court reviewed the proffered testimony of the expert who delineated a
series of factors that influence eyewitnesses to err in identifying individ-
uals involved in criminal activity. These factors included: (1) the ten-
dency of witnesses to shocking events to misidentify, rather than
identify more accurately; (2) the typical nature of an immediate identifi-
cation to be more reliable than one in which time has passed-the "for-
getting curve"; (3) the process of "unconscious transfer" that occurs
when the witness confuses the person identified with another individual,
often as a consequence of viewing a photo lineup; (4) the tendency of an
eyewitness to incorporate information received after the event into her
identification recollection, particularly when feedback from others con-
firms a particular perception; and (5) the fact that the accuracy of the
witness' identification is likely to vary substantially from the witness's
belief in her own accuracy.2 °3
Reviewing the proffered expert opinion on each of these points, the
Chapple court concluded that the expert's testimony would assist jurors
precisely because of common misperceptions about the way in which the
human memory works.204 The recognition of admissibility of this type
of testimony in appropriate cases has influenced other courts to overrule
prior decisions categorically excluding expert testimony relating to
human perception. The Georgia Supreme Court did this in Johnson v.
State, °5 yet it also declined to endorse the minority position that exclu-
sion of the testimony results is a per se abuse of discretion.20 6 The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court overruled prior decisions holding expert testimony
on human perception inadmissible in Commonwealth v. Christie.207 The
supreme court elected to follow the "vast majority" of courts that have
committed the question to the trial court's exercise of discretion rather
than adopting the alternatives of either admissibility per se or exclusion
of the evidence.20 8
The acceptance of expert opinion on human perception by many
courts is an example of empirical evidence promoting a change in
admissibility. The trend toward admission is supported by the consider-
able body of research focusing on common inaccuracies in eyewitness
identification. The body of scientific evidence supporting this field of
203. Id. at 1220-21.
204. Id. at 1221.
205. Johnson v. State, 526 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. 2000) (overruling Jones v. State, 208 S.E.2d 850
(Ga. 1974), and disapproving of Norris v. State, 376 S.E.2d 653 (Ga. 1989), and Cox v. State, 398
S.E.2d 262 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990), as requiring exclusion of expert testimony on human perception).
206. Id. at 552.
207. Commonwealth v. Christie, 98 S.W.3d 485 (Ky. 2002).
208. Id. at 488.
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expertise is extensive.2" 9 Recognition of this well-developed body of
information has prompted many courts following Chapple to admit
expert testimony on the general issue of factors affecting reliability of
eyewitness identification.21 0
Nevertheless, a substantial number of courts continue to refuse
admission of expert testimony on human perception, as the Kansas
Supreme Court did in State v. Wheaton.2 1  There the court relied upon a
cautionary instruction on the potential hazards of eyewitness identifica-
tion rather than permitting an expert opinion on the factors that may
influence the accuracy of an identification in particular circumstances. 21 2
The trend toward admissibility, however, has followed more extensive
psychological research, as the appellant argued in Wheaton.213 This sug-
gests for appellate counsel the need to advise trial attorneys to lay the
proper predicate for admission of expert testimony on eyewitness credi-
bility in order to urge changes in the law of admissibility in those
remaining jurisdictions that categorically exclude this expertise.
Another example of developments in psychological research influ-
encing admissibility determinations was the recognition of post-trau-
matic stress disorder (PTSD) by the mental health community
approximately twenty-five years ago. 214 This disorder began to be
understood during the Vietnam War when servicemen returned home
209. Perhaps most significantly, the Department of Justice commissioned a national study on
the reliability of eyewitness identification, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/njj/
178240.pdf, which discusses the inherent problems of observation and recollection in eyewitness
identification. A second DOJ study, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY
SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL
(1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf, concluded that a significant
number of wrongful convictions were based on eyewitness mis-identifications. For a leading
academic investigation, see ELIZABETH F. Lorus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979), and for a
more recent work, see R.E. GEISELMAN, EYEWITNESS EXPERT TESTIMONY (1996).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); People v. McDonald,
690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984) (holding exclusion of properly qualified expert testimony on human
perception was abuse of discretion). Other courts have held this expert testimony is generally
admissible. United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Stevens, 935
F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991); Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); State v.
Moon, 726 P.2d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). Courts have often relied upon the standards for
admissibility of expert testimony articulated in United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53
(9th Cir. 1973), in determining admissibility of human perception testimony.
211. State v. Wheaton, 729 P.2d 1183, 1186-88 (Kan. 1986) (discussing and rejecting the
Chapple rationale).
212. Id. at 1185 (citing State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236 (Kan. 1981)).
213. Id. at 1188 (declining to accept the appellant's assertion as correct).
214. This disorder was not recognized by the American Psychiatric Association until 1980.
Dever v. Kan. State Penitentiary, 788 F. Supp. 496, 498 (D. Kan. 1992). The Veteran's
Administration did not recognize the disorder as a treatable disease until 1980 either. State v.
Serrato, 424 So. 2d 214, 223 (La. 1982).
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experiencing problems. These servicemen were often diagnosed as suf-
fering from "Vietnam stress syndrome."'21 5 PTSD is characterized by
anxiety resulting from exposure to a particularly traumatic event outside
the normal realm of human experience. Symptoms include: recollec-
tions of the event; recurring dreams of the event; sleeplessness; hyperac-
tivity; startle response; and a dissociative state.
2 16
The defensive use of evidence of PTSD has impacted the criminal
law in two distinctive, and sometimes contrary, ways. For example, the
impairment may be viewed as essentially a form of mental state disorder
implicating either the accused's sanity or degree of culpability because it
may reflect an inability to appreciate criminality of conduct or ability to
conform one's conduct to the requirements of law.2 17 Alternatively,
PTSD may also be relevant to a determination that a sane accused acted
in self-defense because it influenced her ability to properly appreciate a
potential threat to which she has responded.2" 8 Some jurisdictions have
viewed PTSD as relevant to only one of these inquiries,2" 9 while others
permit the defensive use of the evidence with respect to either. 2
Changing views on the admissibility of psychological evidence for
self-defense claims have allowed the defensive use of Battered
Woman's Syndrome, a form of PTSD. Growing acceptance within the
community of mental health professionals of syndrome-based defensive
theories, including Battered Woman's Syndrome, has caused many
appellate courts to allow the admission of evidence relating to the pres-
ence of the syndrome or its symptoms in the criminal defendant.
In a leading case on the admissibility of Battered Women's Syn-
drome evidence, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Kelly2 2' con-
sidered admissibility of expert testimony purporting to explain the
215. For a general discussion of this disorder in returning veterans, see State v. Felde, 422 So.
2d 370, 376-78 (La. 1982), and the dissenting opinion of Justice Henderson in Miller v. State, 338
N.W.2d 673, 678-82 (S.D. 1983) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
216. Dever, 788 F. Supp. at 498 (citing State v. DeMoss, 770 P.2d 441, 444 (Kan. 1989)).
217. State v. Coogan, 453 N.W.2d 186, 190-91 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (holding evidence of
PTSD admissible in guilt phase of trial if relevant to issue of accused's inability to form criminal
intent). But see State v. Morgan, 536 N.W.2d 425, 439-40 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding PTSD
not relevant to guilt phase issues if not implicating accused's lack of criminal intent).
218. E.g., State v. Purcell, 669 N.E.2d 60, 62-63 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (prosecution and
defense experts agreed defendant suffered from PTSD, but disagreed on issue of whether
perception of threat was influenced by "flashback" resulting in "hyperarousal" response causing
overreaction); see also Commonwealth v. Pitts, 740 A.2d 726, 733-34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
219. E.g., State v. Harris, 870 S.W.2d 798, 816 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (concluding that PTSD
defense is inconsistent with self-defense under state law).
220. See, e.g., State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1335-36 (Ohio 1998) (finding evidence of
"battered child syndrome," a PTSD-based defense, is admissible as relevant to both defense of
intent and of self-defense).
221. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
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defendant's perception of the threat which prompted her to use force
against her husband, the victim. The defendant had suffered long-term
abuse by her husband. 2 The court observed that developments in the
preceding decade, provided a new and better understanding of the psy-
chological experience of battered victims demonstrated that a battered
victim's perception might give rise to a legitimate claim of self-
defense. 3 The court described the research results in support of its
conclusion by examining theories underlying the syndrome at length. 4
In Kelly, the trial court excluded expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome225 based on the prior holding in State v. Bess,22 6
where expert testimony on the reasonableness of a defendant's percep-
tion of the threat giving rise to his claim of self-defense had been
rejected.227 The court did not overrule Bess, 28 instead it distinguished
the thrust of the two uses of expert testimony reflected in the differences
in expert opinion in the two cases. In Bess, the expert had offered the
opinion of a psychologist who examined the defendant and concluded
that because of his emotional instability and below-average intelligence,
he would tend to become confused and overact when confronted by an
emotionally exciting experience. 229 The defendant was charged with
murdering a much larger individual whom he claimed was attempting to
commit a robbery. 23 ° Killing the larger man was, according to the
defendant, done to prevent the robbery and in self-defense. 23' The court
held that the expert's proffered opinion, that the defendant's response to
a threat resulting in a claim of self-defense was reasonable under the
circumstances, was inadmissible because it assessed the state of the
accused's mind under a subjective standard, rather than an objective
standard as required by state law.232
The Kelly court distinguished Bess, holding that expert testimony
on the question of reasonableness of the actor's belief in the perceived
danger would be admissible, apparently assuming that any actor in the
222. Id. at 368-69. The court noted the apparent first attempted defensive use of Battered
Woman's Syndrome reported in lbn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 631-40 (D.C. 1979)
(discussing potential viability of expert testimony), appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C.
1983) (holding trial court not required to admit expert testimony on facts). Kelly, 478 A.2d at 376.
223. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369-72.
224. Id. at 370-74.
225. Id. at 381.
226. State v. Bess, 247 A.2d 669 (N.J. 1968).
227. Id. at 672-73.
228. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377.
229. Bess, 247 A.2d at 672.
230. Id. at 671.
231. Id. at 672.
232. Id.
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same situation would have reasonably reached the same conclusion.233
The court thus distinguished between expert opinion that essentially
characterized the accused's testimony as "honest" from that which
would permit a jury to conclude that any person in the accused's situa-
tion could objectively be found to have had a reasonable belief that the
perceived threat justified use of force. The Kelly court effectively per-
mitted expert opinion that jurors could use to reach a conclusion on the
objective reasonableness of the accused's perception that force was jus-
tified, as long as the testimony itself related to objective factors. In
essence, the Kelly court opened the door to far broader admissibility of
psychological opinion about the accused's state of mind than had previ-
ously been contemplated by the Bess opinion without actually overruling
the earlier decision.
Admission of expert testimony on the defendant's state of mind at
the time of an assault when claiming self-defense has proved to be a
rather innovative use of expert opinion at trial. In State v. Branchal,
234
the New Mexico court considered its exclusion in a murder prosecution
where the circumstances would have ruled out a traditional self-defense
instruction because the accused provoked the assault and the threat was
not immediate.2 35 Branchal had been repeatedly threatened by her hus-
band, who often would become intoxicated and put a fingerless glove on
one hand that he claimed permitted him to talk to the "Devil." The
deceased was wearing a fingerless glove when his body was examined
by the medical examiner. 236 The defense offered the testimony of a psy-
chologist who had examined the defendant and was prepared to offer an
233. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377. The court may have actually drawn its line based on the tenor of
the questioning of the two experts, rather than on the experts' findings. It held:
We also find the expert testimony relevant to the reasonableness of defendant's
belief that she was in imminent danger of death or serious injury. We do not mean
that the expert's testimony could be used to show that it was understandable that a
battered woman might believe that her life was in danger when indeed it was not
and when a reasonable person would not have so believed, for admission for that
purpose would clearly violate the rule set forth in State v. Bess. Expert testimony in
that direction would be relevant solely to the honesty of defendant's belief, not its
objective reasonableness. Rather, our conclusion is that the expert's testimony, if
accepted by the jury, would have aided it in determining whether, under the
circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed there was imminent danger
to her life.
Id. at 377 (citations omitted).
234. State v. Branchal, 684 P.2d 1163 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
235. Id. at 1167. The trial court commented on the record that it did not want to condone
retaliation for past domestic violence. The record reflected a lengthy history of violence and
threatening acts by the defendant's husband directed at her, her family, and their children. The
evidence included the defendant's prior attempt to obtain assistance from police, who advised her
that the problem was a family problem that she would have to resolve on her own.
236. Id. at 1165.
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opinion not only on the reasonableness of her perception of fear, but also
on her subjective belief in her right to use deadly force in defense of
herself and her family. 237 Unlike the New Jersey court in Kelly, how-
ever, the Branchal court did not draw the fine distinction between
admissible opinion on the objective reasonableness of her response and
her honesty in invoking the right to use force in self-defense:
Defendant also offered proof through Dr. Salazar, a psychologist,
concerning her state of mind when she fired the fatal shot. The psy-
chologist would have testified that she was a religious person and that
she took the fingerless glove and the victim's invocation of the devil
seriously. He would have explained the predictability of the victim's
behavior when drunk, why defendant felt trapped in the kitchen and
why she did not leave the victim. He would have testified that she
was afraid for her life when she fired the fatal shot.238
The New Mexico court did not make any reference to Battered
Woman's Syndrome and apparently the defense expert had not relied on
this diagnosis in his proffered testimony at trial. Yet, it is clear that in
this early application of the rationale for admitting expert opinion on the
justification for use of deadly force against an abuser, the court was
confronted with the problem of reconciling this approach with the tradi-
tional self-defense claim issues of immediacy of threat and reasonable-
ness of the response. It gave an expansive answer on this issue, opening
the door to reliance on novel expert opinion on issues of mental state.
The theory of "syndrome" evidence in self-defense cases was
explained by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Robinson v. State.23 9
The discussion of the defensive application of the theory arose in the
context of an ineffective assistance claim directed against counsel who
failed to raise the defense at trial. 240 In its discussion, the court accepted
the syndrome as accurate,241 and concluded that it has value in assisting
the jury in analyzing the application of the law of self-defense to the
battered victim charged with homicide or assault against her abuser.242
The syndrome theoretically explains or justifies the accused's act of vio-
lence in terms of delayed reaction to the terror imposed by the abuser. A
significant number of jurisdictions have responded to a general recogni-
tion of the Battered Woman Syndrome diagnosis by holding that expert
testimony is admissible on the syndrome in support of a claim of self-
237. Id. at 1167.
238. Id.
239. Robinson v. State, 417 S.E.2d 88 (S.C. 1992).
240. Id. at 90.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 90-92.
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defense.243 Although the "science" underlying the theory that battered
women, or spouses, or anyone involved in intimate relationships
2 4
behave in particular patterns remains subject to criticism,245 courts have
adopted their approaches to the general recognition that self-defense
may be treated more broadly than in traditional contexts.
When dealing with newly developing scientific or technical knowl-
edge, counsel intent upon forcing the court to reevaluate prior decisions
limiting admissibility should stress the increasing acceptance of the
expertise within the relevant field and make the proper offer of proof
supporting the change in law sought.
Developments in scientific and technological knowledge will
undoubtedly result in a continuing assault on precedents based on infor-
mation rendered outdated by these advancements. Perhaps cognizant of
the long-range potential for litigation of issues relating to advancements
in other fields of knowledge and expertise, the Supreme Court's decision
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.246 articulates a new
framework for evaluation of the science underlying expert opinion. For
jurisdictions adopting Daubert, or Daubert-like247 approaches to admis-
sibility of expert evidence; in light of its reasoning, the prospects for
challenge to existing precedents would appear healthy.
243. E.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So.
2d 801, 806-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Chapman v. State, 367 S.E.2d 541, 543 (Ga. 1988);
State v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 477
(Kan. 1985); Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Ky. 1990); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d
892, 894 (Me. 1981); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798-99 (Minn. 1989); State v. Williams,
787 S.W.2d 308, 310-11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 368 (N.J. 1984);
State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268, 1274 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358,
363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 819 (N.D. 1983); State v. Koss,
551 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ohio 1990); State v. Moore, 695 P.2d 985, 987-88 (Or. Ct. App. 1985);
Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 782-83 (Pa. 1989); State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121
(S.C. 1986); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315-16 (Wash. 1984); State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558,
564-65 (W. Va. 1987).
244. Expert opinion that a sixteen year old defendant charged with murder of his mother
suffered from Battered Child Syndrome was recognized as admissible on issues of his criminal
intent and justification of use of forced based on his perception of threat in State v. Nemeth, 694
N.E.2d 1332, 1334-36 (Ohio 1998).
245. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Domestic Violence: Competing Conceptions of Equality in the
Law of Evidence, 47 Loy. L. REV. 81, 113-24 (2001). Professor Beecher-Monas offers a scathing
critique of the traditional view of Battered Woman's Syndrome, arguing that it cannot be
reconciled with standards for admissibility that require expert opinion to be grounded in sound
scientific principles. Instead, she argues that courts have accepted syndrome evidence, apparently
in sympathetic response to the significant problem of domestic abuse without requiring a showing
of scientific authenticity imposed on other subjects of expert opinion.
246. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For an overview of Daubert
and its approach to admissibility, see Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due
Process: A Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563 (2000).
247. E.g., Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. 1991).
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V. CONCLUSION
The development of an effective argument for overruling precedent
is often the product of cooperation between trial and appellate counsel,
or the appreciation of counsel for the need to assert the argument for
overruling in the trial court. The rules of error preservation necessitate
asserting grounds for overruling precedent in the trial court; failure to do
so will generally doom any argument advanced for the first time in the
appeal. 248  Generally, even claims of constitutional error may be for-
feited by failure to preserve error in timely and appropriate fashion at
trial, regardless of whether the claim is based on federal249 or state con-
stitutional grounds.25 0  Notwithstanding how interesting the appellate
argument may be in relying on novel grounds, lack of preservation of
the claim at trial will likely result in the appellate court refusing to con-
sider the merits of the claim.2
5 1
Arguably, of course, a claim requiring overruling of precedent
might succeed as a matter of fundamental error, assuming a court would
conclude that application of the precedent resulted in denial of funda-
mental fairness in the proceedings. The requirement that preservation
rules be followed with regard to existing precedent that binds a trial
court renders objection almost always futile. Because the trial court is
bound by existing precedent, one can hardly justify asking that same
court to overrule precedent as a threshold for asserting the same argu-
ment in the appellate courts actually empowered to reconsider the wis-
dom of their prior decisions.252 Nevertheless, effective representation
requires recognition and respect for existing preservation rules, although
appellate counsel may well decide to argue for the overruling of prece-
dent as a matter of fundamental error.
The well-recognized doctrine of "plain error," as opposed to "fun-
248. E.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (holding that a failure to assert
error in the trial court constitutes a forfeiture of the claim or right).
249. See Taylor v. State, 851 A.2d 551, 557 (Md. 2004) (defendant's failure to assert claim of
prior jeopardy waives error).
250. E.g., Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (defendant's reliance
on Fifth Amendment basis for claim at trial waived reliance on comparable state constitutional
provision where trial counsel did not include state constitutional basis for argument to trial court).
251. For instance, in Maso v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't Motor Vehicle Div., 96 P.3d
286, 289 1 7-8 (N.M. 2004), the New Mexico Supreme Court declined to consider a novel claim
raised as a matter of state constitutional law on direct appeal that had not been preserved at trial
regarding failure to include Spanish translation in public document. The court held that the claim
must first have been asserted on state constitutional grounds in the trial court. Id. Accord State v.
Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 8 23 (N.M. 1997).
252. For an excellent argument for recognizing exceptions to the preservation rules when trial
objection would be futile, see Brent E. Newton, An Argument for Reviving the Actual Futility
Exception to the Supreme Court's Procedural Default Doctrine, 4 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESs 521
(2002).
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damental error," certainly will not afford appellate counsel grounds for
excusing the preservation requirement.253 By definition, the concept of
plain error requires that there be "error"-deviation from application of
a legal rule that is both plain and clear.2 54 The underlying concept of
"plain error" is contrary, in theory, to the argument that precedent
should be overruled despite lack of objection precisely because the trial
court's adherence to existing precedent will not constitute error.
Assuming preservation of the claim for overruling precedent in the
trial court, appellate counsel is positioned to advance the argument on
behalf of the client in the appellate courts. The assertion of a properly
preserved claim for a change in the law reflects the necessary catalyst
for change in law contemplated by the common law system. When
appellate counsel makes a good faith claim for overruling, modifying or,
in fact, extending existing precedent, her representation is consistent
with zealous representation of her client. It is also consistent with both
the text and spirit of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Many appellate lawyers equate timidity with deference to the court,
and equate such deference with respect. Unfortunately, the lack of pas-
sion often displayed in appellate practice may lead reviewing courts to
the conclusion that a case or claim is so lacking in legal or equitable
merit that the client's own lawyer has little or no interest in the merits of
the appeal. Ethical representation simply does not foreclose aggressive
advocacy.
253. The concept of "plain error," as set forth in Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, was examined fully by the Supreme Court in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725
(1993).
254. Id. at 732-33.
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